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SOFTWARE RENTAL, PIRACY, AND
COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONt
A recent development in the computer industry has been the
emergence of software rental companies.' For fifteen to twenty-five
percent of the cost of a program, a person or business can rent a
software package for a one to three week trial period. If the lessee
decides to purchase the package, the rental price is credited toward
the selling price. The software manufacturers want this practice
stopped. They believe it is a profitable exploitation of their product
and an infringement of their copyright. One manufacturer has initi2
ated suit against one of the rental companies.
The leasing of software packages is clearly a profitable exploitation of the manufacturer's labor, but it is not an infringement of the
copyright statute. The owner of a copy of copyrighted material is
free to alienate that copy in any manner, including lease.3 The only
infringement that can be claimed is that the lessee is copying the
package and retaining the copy at the termination of the lease. The
claim would then be that the lessor is contributorily infringing on
the copyright by making the packages readily available without
purchase. If it can be proven that the lessor knew or had reason to
know that the lessee leased the package with the intention of copying it, the claim will be upheld with respect to lessees who use the
package for profit.4 Personal, private copying, however, may fall5
under the aegis of fair use, which may exculpate the lessor as well.
This Note will argue that software manufacturers need and deserve protection from short-term renting companies. There is both
legislative authority and a policy justification for granting a fair use
exemption for private, noncommercial users, but the exemption
t Awarded National Fourth Place in the Computer/Law Journal's First Annual
Computer Law Writing Contest.
1. Software Rentals: Piracy is the Hot New Issue, Bus. Wk., Aug. 1, 1983, at 90
[hereinafter cited as Software Rentals].
2. Id. MicroPro International Corp. is suing United Computer Corp. in the federal district court in San Francisco.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982).
4. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159 (2d Cir. 1971); Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
5. See infra § III for a discussion of fair use.
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should not protect a lessor's exploitation of a manufacturer's product. The protection should be granted by amendment to or interpretation of the copyright laws. Other remedies that are available do
not offer adequate protection.
I. THE RIGHT TO RENT SOFTWARE IS PROTECTED
BY STATUTE
Under existing law, software rental is not piracy, but a fully protected right of the owner of a copy of copyrighted material. Under
section 106(3) of the Copyright Act of 1976,6 the copyright owner has
the exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer or by rental,
lease or lending." Nevertheless, section 109(a) severely restricts
that right once title to a particular copy of the work has been relinquished: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this
title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without
the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy or phonorecord. '7 If the holder of the
copyright has relinquished all title in the physical copy, the copyright law does not allow him to restrict the disposition of the copy.
If the copyright holder retains some claim of ownership, such as by
transferring possession through rental, lease, loan or other means,
section 106(3) still applies and the copyright holder can control distribution. For large computers, or mainframes, this arrangement is
common and takes the form of licensing agreements that usually
carry maintenance agreements as well. Software manufacturers
have tried to sell the right to use the software without selling any
rights in the physical copy by granting licenses to software "purchasers" and theoretically retaining title of copies. 8 Nevertheless,
software packages for personal computers are consumer products
and are generally sold at retail to unsophisticated consumers. As a
result, the assertion that the copy is not the owner's property might
not be valid.9 If the distinction is not valid, then the purchaser is authorized to rent the software.
In addition, the courts have adhered to the "first sale" doctrine.
Under this doctrine, the courts hold that the right of copying re6. Pub. L No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as 17 U.S.C.); 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(3) (1982).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982).
8. See Software Rentals, supra note 1, at 91.
9. If there is no meeting of the minds, or mutual understanding regarding the
"right to use" limitation, the limitation may be struck from the contract as unconscionable. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, ONE VOLUME EDITION, § 107 (1952).
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mains with the copyright holder, but the right to alienate a copy belongs to the lawful possessor or owner of the physical copy. 10
Therefore, an agreement not to sell a copy is enforceable in contract,
but a sale in violation of such an agreement will not constitute infringement under copyright law." The right to control resale is not
vested by copyright.' 2 For example, when defendant copyright holders refused to sell to retailers who sold books below list price, the
Supreme Court held that copyright protection could not be invoked
for unlawful restraint of trade under the
as a defense to an action
13
Sherman Antitrust Act.
One may argue that the first sale doctrine is granted in order to
give the copyright holder remedies against possessors or owners of
unauthorized copies when no remedy is available against the infringing copier. The doctrine does not support any right of the copy4
right holder in the physical copies.'
While the above-mentioned arguments support the first sale
doctrine generally, there are also policy reasons to adhere to the
first sale doctrine as it relates to computer software. Software rental
by someone other than the copyright holder serves a special function. Computer consultants and software houses match the needs of
a client as closely as possible to the hardware and software available on the market and then "customize" the collection by writing
routines to connect the functioning of different packages or to simplify data entry for a particular application.' 5 They may lease the
whole package as a "turnkey" system, the name reflecting the idea
that all the user has to do is turn on the system, while the system
does the rest. Such systems may come with maintenance agreements for the length of the lease, so that the consultant will handle
problems with either hardware or software. In an area that is growing and changing as fast as computers, and where expertise is expensive to maintain, these arrangements are very valuable. These
arrangements are also not likely to result in piracy, as the lessee has
possession of the software and hardware for the same amount of
time, that is, the amount of time for which the software has value to
10. United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977).
11. Id.
12. Independent News Co. v. Williams, 184 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd, 203
F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961).
13. Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n, 231 U.S. 226 (1913).
14. See 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12 (1983).
15. This does not infringe the copyright holder's rights under 17 U.S.C. § 117
(1982) (adaptions may only be transferred with the consent of the copyright owner).
This work affects not the package, but the interface between the package and the
screen, which is external to the copyrighted work.
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him. Additionally, the quality of the custom package is enhanced by
the ability of the consultant to choose different parts of the system
from different vendors. If copyright holders had exclusive control
over rental, packages containing the works of competing companies
would be less readily available.
The copyright holder would likely desire control over the use
and transfer of his work even after sale. 16 If no copies could be lent,
leased, or sold to a third party, every person who wanted access to a
work would have to purchase a copy. Congress and the courts did
not elect to grant the copyright owner such control over distribution
of the tangible physical property which embodies the copyrighted
work. All rights to copy remain with the copyright holder, but all
other rights of ownership belong to the purchaser.
II.

CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT

The question in this section arises from the nature of a short
term rental of software. Business sense indicates that one would
not spend fifteen to twenty-five percent of the cost of a product
merely to try it out for one to three weeks. 17 The payoff must be
elsewhere. The likely source of the payoff is copying. It makes good
sense to rent a copy of a program for fifteen to twenty-five percent of
list price in order to make another copy when the degree of protection the copyright affords is still open to debate. 18
When commercial lessees make and retain a copy of software
after returning the rented original copy, they clearly infringe on the
copyright holder's exclusive right to reproduction. Nevertheless, the
cost of discovering individual infringers and obtaining a remedy outweighs the harm that most infringers cause. The likelihood of an adequate remedy is slim, as is the case with infringement of audio
visual works.' 9 The aggregate cost of this abuse, however, may be
substantial.
If the software lessor knows or has reason to know that the
lessee is copying the software and retaining a copy, he may be held
liable on a theory of contributory infringement. In Screen GemsColumbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.,20 where a retailer
sold records at a price "suspiciously below market price," the copy16. M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.12[A] at 8-117.
17. See Software Rentals, supra note 1.
18. See Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23
JURIMETRICS J. 337, 340-48 (1983).
19. Note, Copyright-The Home Video Recording Controversy, 81 W. VA. L. REV.
231, 250 (1979); Marsh, Betamax and Fair Use: A Shotgun Marriage,21 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 49, 74 (1981).
20. 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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right, owner was held to have a cause of action. The court based its
reasoning on the tort notion that one who knowingly participates in
tortious activity is jointly and severally liable with the primary
tortfeasor. In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,21 a manager who allowed his performing clients to perform copyrighted works without proper licenses was held
contributorily liable, even though he had not infringed the copyright
himself. The manager was in a position to control the infringement
and did not; he was therefore liable.
For software lessors, the threshold question for finding contributory infringement is whether and to what extent the lessee is pirating software. If copying activity is minimal, the staples of commerce
doctrine would bar a finding of contributory infringement. If most
customers are merely trying the software before purchasing it, and
are not retaining copies, then the lessor is providing a valuable serv22
ice and should not be liable for the acts of an occasional infringer.
If a substantial proportion of the lessees are pirating the software by
retaining copies, then the lessor should be charged with knowledge
of the infringement. Since eighty percent of the revenues of
software sales and rental companies come from rentals, 23 the
probability of piracy is high.
If the infringement occurs in conjunction with a profit making
activity, the doctrine of fair use does not offer a defense. 24 Section
107 of the copyright code outlines the elements that support a finding of fair use:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
21.
22.
23.
24.

443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
See Software Rentals, supra note 1.
Id. at 91.
Marsh, supra note 19, at 55.
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25
of the copyrighted work.

With software copying, the work is an identical copy. There is
not even the loss of fidelity associated with home audio recording.
In addition, the activity of renting is engaged in for profit. Software
is "read" by a computer to create a tool; it is not read by the lessee
to obtain information. 26 The concept of the free flow of ideas, which
is embodied in the Constitution 27 and which excuses behavior such
as copying news programs for scholarly reasons, 28 does not apply to
29
software rental. The constitutional clause justifying copyright
does not justify the theft of traditional tools of research and development, such as laboratory equipment, even when the tools are
used to further scientific developments. Likewise, it cannot justify
30
the theft of intellectual property to create such a tool.
The only possible application of the doctrine of fair use to
software rental is if a majority of lessees are using the software legitimately, while but a few are pirating software. The lessor may
have knowledge of the infringement, but the nature of his involvement is that of an unwilling participant, as he has no control over
the lessees' actions. Conversely, the lessor who gains substantial
profit from leasing to people who make and retain copies has no
more control over such behavior, but engages in the rental business
specifically to profit from the lessees' piracy. This approach of finding contributory infringement but allowing a fair use defense, or
finding that the activity interferes with the copyright holder's rights
but does not constitute infringement because of fair use, may be
preferable to finding no contributory infringement in the case of
minimal abuse. 3 ' There is some harm to the copyright holder, and
the lessor is contributing to that harm. But the benefit of the lessor's business to society should be weighed against the harm to the
software developer's incentive to produce, just as the relative benefit or harm from direct infringement is analyzed under section 107.
The amount of damage standing alone should not decide the issue of
infringement, for to do so would mean that the single user would not
be an infringer. Fair use developed as an "equitable rule of rea25.
26.
27.
28.
CONG.
29.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
See Davidson, supra note 18, for a description of this "reading" process.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEws 5659, 5678-80 (legislative history of § 107 of the Copyright Act).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

30. See, e.g., Encyclopedia Brittanica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp.
1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (despite the fact that individual copying for scholarly purposes

would be fair, the wholesale copying for profit did not constitute fair use).
31. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.05[E] for a discussion of this rationale as
applied to photocopying.
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son." 32 It excludes from infringement liability uses providing more
benefit to society in furtherance of the arts and sciences than societal detriment by reducing the copyright holder's incentive to
33
produce.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not adopted a fair use
standard for analysis of contributory infringement. In Universal
City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America 34 (Betamax), Universal Studios sued Sony on the theory that, by manufacturing and distributing video cassette recorders (VCR's), Sony was contributing to the
copyright infringement that occurred when the purchasers of VCR's
copied the plaintiffs' programs. The court adopted the standard that
there is no contributory infringement if the product may "merely be
capable of substantial noninfringing uses, ' 35 drawing an analogy to
the staples of commerce doctrine in patent law. 36 Such a broad
standard was unnecessary. The court found time-shifting to be a
substantial noninfringing use; this finding alone would have been
sufficient to preclude liability, without resort to the "mere capability" language.
Future courts may distinguish between providing the copying
32. H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5679.
33. See Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 446-56 (C.D.
Cal. 1979) (discussing fair use), rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S.
Ct. 774 (1984).
34. 104 S.Ct. 774 (1984). The district and appellate courts in Betamax decided differently the question of whether the copyright holder had reason to know of the infringement. The district court recognized that if the manufacturer could be charged
with knowledge of infringement, and if there were not substantial noninfringing uses,
the manufacturer would be contributorily negligent. Nevertheless, it held that, assurming home video copying was not fair use, the defendants' knowledge of infringement was insufficient to make them liable. A home video recorder is a staple of
commerce, and the manufacturer cannot be held liable if such an item is used later
for an illegal act. Otherwise, the manufacturer of typewriters would be held liable for
extortion letters subsequently typed on it. Sony had no direct contact with the consumer, and Henry's Camera, the retailer, had insufficient contacts with the Griffiths,
the actual copiers, to have any knowledge of the use they would make of the product.
Furthermore, since the limits of copyright protection for home video recording had
not been determined, the defendants could not be charged with knowledge of copyright infringement.
The Court of Appeals did not find home video recording to be fair use. The court
did not dispute the value of the staples of commerce doctrine, but held that a home
video recorder did not have substantial noninfringing uses, and could not be protected by the doctrine. Sony could be charged with constructive knowledge of the infringing uses. An actual lack of knowledge of the law speaks to the remedy, not to a
finding of infringement.
35. Id. at 789.
36. Id. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982) for the patent provision.
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equipment and providing the copyrighted work itself, but this is unlikely. If the right to rent were not granted by section 109(a) of the
Copyright Act, renting alone might be sufficient to find inducement
to infringe. But, since the right to rent is granted by statute, and
selling the copying equipment and providing the copyrighted work
by rental equally facilitate the piracy, both activities should be
judged by the same standard for contributory infringement. People
may rent software merely to see if it will do the task for which it is
being purchased, deciding to purchase the software if it performs
adequately. Thus, short term rental is capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
The second test for contributory infringement is that the infringer's actions must induce, cause, or materially contribute to the
infringing conduct of another. 37 It seems that making software
available for fifteen to twenty-five percent of the purchase price,
with no supervision to ensure that copying does not occur, would
materially contribute to the infringing conduct of another. Furthermore, creating the opportunity to copy software that is identical to
the original for a seventy-five to eighty-five percent discount may be
construed as an inducement to infringe. 38 In Betamax, the Supreme
Court adopted a stringent standard for finding infringement. Making VCR's available for use in copying did not induce infringement,
even though virtually all television programs that a VCR might copy
are copyrighted. The court implied that Sony might be liable if its
advertisement induced infringement but, it, standing alone, making
the means available for piracy did not constitute inducement.
The third test of contributory infringement is the nature of the
relationship between the direct infringer and the contributor. When
the contributor is the employer or agent of the direct infringer, he
may be liable. 39 If the contributor substantially benefits from the infringement, he may be liable.4° The test appears to be limited to
cases where the person who benefits from another's infringement is
in a position to prohibit the infringement. Merely selling the equipment used in infringing activities, or making the product available
41
for infringement, is not sufficient.
37. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Man., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971); Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
38. See Software Rentals, supra note 1.
39. Shapiro, Bernstein, & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
40. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Man., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d
Cir. 1971).
41. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 459-61
(C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
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The court in Betamax did not discuss contributory infringement
in terms of the general standard for contributory liability in tort.
The joint tortfeasor must be "proceeding tortiously, which is to say
with intent to commit a tort, or with negligence. One who innocently, and carefully, does an act which furthers the tortious purpose of another is not acting in concert with him. '4 2 For example,
the agent who allows clients to perform copyrighted songs is either
negligent or intentionally benefiting from the infringement. On the
other hand, Sony had reason to believe that home recording would
be fair use; it was intentionally contributing to the activity of copying, but not necessarily to infringement. Likewise, the lessor who
enters the software rental market to earn profits generated by noninfringing lessees and does all possible to ensure piracy is not occurring, but who unintentionally assists a pirate, is not acting tortiously
and should not be liable under a tort rationale. Nevertheless, if the
market is profitable only because it provides assistance to pirates,
then the lessor intends to profit from the piracy and is acting tortiously and should be liable. This analysis is consistent with
Betamax and will lead to a just evaluation of software lessors.
III.

HOME COPYING AS FAIR USE

It might not be an infringement of copyright for a private individual to copy another individual's copy of software for personal,
noncommercial use.43 This practice is similar to the reproduction of
phonorecords onto audio cassettes that is common today. Neither
practice is entered into for profit. Both are modern high-technology
examples of lending and borrowing among friends. Likewise, giving
away a tape without expecting it to be returned is motivated by the
same qualities of generosity and friendship that would motivate
lending the original. In some instances, it is simply more convenient to give away the copy than to lend the original. The finding in
44
Betamax that time-shifting (taping for later viewing) is fair use
supports the argument that copying for convenience is fair use. In
the case of a software diskette, the possibility of hardware malfunction is always present. In order to avoid the risk of damage to the
original, a person is likely to lend a copy rather than the original,
45
even when expecting the copy to be returned.
42. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 292 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
44. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 789.
45. The Congress recognized the special need to copy software for this purpose in
enacting the Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982)).
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If personal copying is not fair use and if the prohibition against
copying could be enforced, the practice of making copies to give
away might be curtailed, but the practice of lending would continue.
If both lender and borrower made frequent use of a particular program, the borrower might eventually purchase a personal copy, assuming affordability. Programs cost from $25 to $500. The lower end
of the spectrum is comprised mainly of games and utilities that substitute simpler commands for more tedious programming functions.
People are more likely to borrow the games and do without the utilities if they cannot afford a personal copy. The higher end of the
spectrum, software selling for more than $200, includes major
software packages that transform the computer into different tools,
such as spreadsheet, database, and word processing systems. Although it is conceivable that an individual user could write such
packages with the languages built into the computer, it is unlikely
that many would do so. 46 The cost of these packages makes doing
without a more likely substitute for piracy than purchasing the
software. The potential loss of sales is limited to those purchases
that would be made because copying is illegal and borrowing is impractical. It is unlikely that sharing software among friends by
copying rather than borrowing shrinks the market enough to affect
the availability of diverse products. It may be so unlikely that it
of privacy that enforcement of the copycannot justify the invasion
47
right would require.
With phonorecords the ratio between the cost of a blank tape
and a prerecorded tape is approximately 1:3. If the practice of copying were curtailed, it is likely that a substantial portion of the
money now being spent for blank tapes would be spent on
purchases of phonorecords. The ratio for blank floppy disks (two to
five dollars) to pre-recorded software is 1:10 to 1:250. It is less probable that the money spent on copies would be spent instead on
purchases of software if copying were curtailed, or that the money
otherwise spent on purchases of software would have a major impact on the market. Therefore, the argument that private copying
should be fair use is stronger for software than it is for phonorecords. If privacy concerns justify tolerance of the personal
copying of phonorecords, where copying more than likely reduces
sales of the original recording, the same concerns should justify tol46. Most home computers come with a form of the BASIC language, in which all
of the processes of the larger packages can be performed. A great deal of time would
be required to recreate a package's functioning, however, and such a task takes great
programming sophistication.
47. Despite this, the fair use doctrine should not extend protection to the lessor.
See infra § IV.
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erance of copying and trading of software. Since the major determination of fair use is the presence of economic gain to the infringer or
loss of market for the copyright holder, 48 a finding of fair use is
warranted.
In the legislative history accompanying the Sound Recording
Act of 1971, 4 9 Congress made it clear that the act was not intended
to prohibit taping from radio broadcasts or recordings for private
use. The practice was unrestrained and common in 1971, as was the
practice of trading copies among friends. Nothing in the legislative
history suggests that Congress intended to distinguish copying the
phonorecord of another from copying one's own phonorecord, holding the first, and not the second, a copyright infringement. Likewise,
the practice of trading software is common among computer owners
today and is becoming more common as computers become more
commonplace. If a person may copy a friend's phonorecord, he
should be able to copy a friend's software diskette.
Betamax 50 was expected to determine the extent to which private use is protected under the fair use doctrine. The trial court applied fair use to the home copying of television broadcasts an
analogy to the fair use exception for audio recording. The appellate
court reversed on the theory that Congress created the exception for
audio taping because it was so widespread at the time, but did not
intend to carry the idea over to video recording, which was new and
uncommon at the time. The court felt that fair use protects productive uses, but not nonproductive uses, even when such uses do not
harm the copyright holder.5 1 The Supreme Court reversed on this
issue:
A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires
proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market
for the copyrighted work ....
If the intended use is for commercial
gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated. 52
The court further held that time-shifting, or copying for later viewing, was fair use. It explicitly did not rule on the transfer of tapes to
other persons, or the use of home-recorded tapes for public perform48. Encyclopedia Brittanica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156
(W.D.N.Y. 1982).
49. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1566, 1572.

50. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
51. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970, 971-72 (9th
Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
52. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 793.
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ances, and it did not discuss the maintenance of a tape library. Universal Studios sought no relief against the individual infringer, and
the individual infringer did not appeal the decision, so these issues
were not before the court.
The Supreme Court took an unusual step in this case. After
hearing argument in the 1982 session, it rescheduled the case for reargument in the 1983 session. Commentators believe this was
predominantly a stalling tactic to allow Congress to decide the issue
by legislation. 53 The Supreme Court, by basing its decision in part
on Congressional silence, seems to confirm this belief.54 Congress
did not take up the offer, although members of each house did propose legislation. 55 The author feels that the Congressional silence
should be seen as a mandate to refer back to the legislative history
of section 107. The section should be flexible enough to handle new
technology, and this new technology should be governed by the
same policies and principles that govern older technologies.
This mandate does not immediately answer the question of
whether software copying for private use should be tolerated. A
weighing of the relative advantages and disadvantages to individual
users and producers of intellectual property is still required. Does
copying for private use adversely affect the incentive to produce,
hence affecting the diversity of products on the market? Computer
programs are costly to create. With the limited market that exists,
developers keep royalties high in order to recoup the costs and
make a profit. This results in high prices, which encourages piracy.
Piracy works to keep the market small, which in turn contributes to
high costs. In order to secure relief, the software developer must
prove that an effective ban against copying will break this cycle.
But for many users, computers are only affordable because software
is shared. An enforced prohibition against copying could decrease
computer sales and decrease, rather than increase, software sales.
It is the availability of ideas to society, not the economic interest of
the author, that the copyright laws are designed primarily to protect.56 Congress grants an author a limited monopoly for the sole
purpose of providing the author with an incentive to produce.
53. High Court Faces Old, New Issues, The Nat'l L.J., Oct. 10, 1983, at 8.
54. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 796.
55. H.R. 4783, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (no infringement for home recording);
H.R. 4794, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (no infringement for home recording); H.R.
4808, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., (1981) (no infringement for home recording); H.R. 5250,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., (1981) (no infringement for home use); H.R. 5488, 97th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1982) (elaborate royalty scheme for VCR's); S. 1758 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) (no infringement for home use).
56. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
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A FAIR USE EXCEPTION FOR HOME RECORDING DOES
NOT JUSTIFY CAPITAL EXPLOITATION OF THE
RIGHT

The previous section demonstrated that a fair use exception
may exist for personal, non-profit use of copyrighted materials.
There is, however, another application of this doctrine that considers a use a fair one because society profits from the use of the
copyrighter's work. That fair use doctrine allows authors to quote
short passages from copyrighted works for purposes of illustration
or criticism. It also allows medical libraries to copy and distribute
articles from medical journals. The purposes of these two applications of the fair use doctrine are different. The second applies the
word fair in the sense of just and honest. 57 Absent any considerations outside the purposes and scope of the Copyright Act, the use
of copyrighted material in this manner would be fair. The purpose
of advancing science and the useful arts is best served by allowing
this use of the copyrighter's material. In describing the private use
'
doctrine, the word fair in the sense of "according to the rules," 58 as
in "fair play," is more appropriate. In this case, no justification for
the use lies within the purposes that underly the copyright protection. Rather, the reason for allowing such a copy comes from an59
underlies the
other source. A fundamental right to privacy
decision to deny a remedy to the holder of the copyright.
Despite a finding that the private borrowing and copying of a
software package is a fair use, a person leasing the software for
profit should still be liable for contributory copyright infringement if
there is reason to believe that a copy is being made and retained.
The combined acts of the lessor and lessee have a damaging impact
on the copyright holder's potential profits and motivation to produce
new works. The right to privacy that excuses personal use does not
apply to the lessor. In the criminal law, we may not hold criminally
responsible a person who cannot understand the criminal nature of
his act. 60 Nevertheless, we may hold the person who conspired with
57. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 815 (3d ed. 1966) (definition

7a).

58. Id. (definition 7b).
59. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (finding of a right to
marital privacy as a result of penumbras surrounding the specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights). But see id. at 507-09 (Black, J., dissenting) (there is no constitutional
right to privacy, though there are guarantees in specific provisions designed to protect privacy at certain times and places with respect to certain activities).
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
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him guilty as a conspirator. 6 1 Similarly, we may choose to respect
the right to privacy and protect the copier, but hold liable the lessor,
as a contributory infringer.
The infringement of the rights of the copyright holder is identical whether a person copies a program and sells it for fifteen to
twenty-five percent of its list price, or whether a person leases it for
the same price and allows the lessee to copy it in the privacy of his
home. The only difference is that we may choose not to enforce the
rights against the lessee. This decision, based on privacy concerns,
should not justify the lessor's exploitation of the copyright holder's
product. The place where the copy is made should not determine
the extent of the copyright holder's protection.
This same reasoning can be applied to the decision in Elektra
Records Co. v. Gem Electronic Distributors,Inc. 62 The defendant
owned a coin operated eight-track cartridge copying machine, a
"Make-a-Tape" system. He lent copies of copyrighted works to customers who purchased blank cartridges in his store. They copied
the copyrighted work onto the blank tape and obtained a copy of the
work for $1.49 to $1.99 instead of the $6.00 retail price of a legitimate
copy. The court looked to the legislative history that created the exemption for home audio recording, which provided that a "home recording is for private use and with no purpose of reproducing or
otherwise capitalizing commercially on it."'63 The court reasoned:
In lending the copyrighted sound recording to the customer without
charge, in selling the less costly blank tape from which the spurious
but exact copy may be made, and in providing the equipment
whereby it may be speedily done at minimal cost, defendants are
engaging in mass piracy on a custom basis. To view this activity as
a form of "home recording" would stretch the imagination to the
snapping point. To refuse to protect the plaintiffs' exclusive reproduction and publication rights in such circumstances would defeat
the very purpose of64the sound recording amendment and nullify the
intent of Congress.
The court did not rely on a finding that the employees of Gem
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the

law.").
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("it is immaterial to the liability of a person who solicits or conspires with another to commit a
crime that: . . . (b) the person whom he solicits or with whom he conspires is irresponsible or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction for the commission of a

crime").
62. 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
63. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1566, 1572.
64. Electra Records Co., 360 F. Supp. at 824-25.
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assisted in the copying; it was illegal to create the opportunity to
produce the tape, even if the employees did not actually do the
copying. The court found the defendant's role in the copying to be
an infringement. Similarly, although persons who copy software for
private use may not be infringers, those who profit from making
such copying available should be liable as infringers.
V.

ALTERNATE REMEDIES

Alternate remedies do not offer adequate protection for the
copyright holder. The copyright holder may put conditions on the
contract of sale, but contract remedies are limited to provable damages, which may be impossible to prove. Contract remedies would
also be limited to the first purchaser who actually contracts with the
copyright holder. The remedies in many cases would not extend beyond the retailer, and would never reach a third party lessor or the
pirate. Furthermore, retailers often are forbidden from discriminating among customers, so any contract attempting to discriminate
against pirating customers would be illegal. Software manufacturers have attempted to license only the right to use, but if it is perceived as a sale by the courts, the licensing agreement will be
65
ineffective.
Using technological techniques to limit the ability to copy
software does not provide an adequate solution. 66 In any encryption
scheme, the decoder must be part of the package, and can be reverse engineered. Bit copiers can generally be modified to copy almost any disk. New "wild cards" take a direct copy of the working
program from memory, thereby bypassing the encryption
problems. 67 Furthermore, because of problems of hardware malfunction and operator mistakes, the inability to copy a program for
68
the legitimate purpose of backup makes the product less desirable.
Future technological advances may offer a solution to the problem
of copying, but, for the present, technology does not offer a
69
solution.
The law of unfair competition may allow the software developer
65. See United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1977) (reversing one of
several counts of copyright infringement due to inability of government to prove absence of first sale; language of transaction purported to be license agreement held to
constitute a sale).
66. Davidson, supra note 18, at 411-13.
67. See, e.g., 4 NIBBLE June 1983, at 66.
68. Congress recognized the special need to copy software for this purpose in enacting 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). See Software Rentals, supra note 1 (Penguin Software
removed copy protection schemes from their products).
69. See Davidson, supra note 18, at 411-13.
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to prohibit rental in some jurisdictions: it is not fair to compete
against a company with that company's own product. 70 Other jurisdictions, however, require actual competition, and software rentals
may not be viewed as competing with sales. The software developer
does not want to have his products rented by purchasers, because
renting facilitates piracy, resulting in the loss of sales. This result
would also occur if the developer rented the software. The competition is between legitimate uses of the software and piracy, not between leasing and sales. In jurisdictions requiring actual
competition, however, no remedy will be provided.7 1 Furthermore,
72
the federal copyright statute allows rental of copyrighted works,
73
and may pre-empt state remedies.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The enforcement of copyright protection against individual lessees who pirate software is likely to be too costly to be pursued by a
software developer. Nevertheless, the aggregate effect of piracy by
all lessees of software may adversely affect the profitability of developing software, and therefore affect the diversity of products on the
market. Software rental by agents other than the copyright holder,
however, may sometimes be desirable, as when an independent
agent may combine competitors' products to create a superior system. A complete removal of the rights of an owner of a copy to lease
that copy may also reduce diversity in the marketplace.
Congress should replace the blanket right of the owner of a
copy to lease that copy with a compulsory licensing and royalty
scheme similar to the scheme adopted for audio recording7 4 and proposed for rental of phonorecords and video tapes.7 5 The copyright
holder would get a royalty, and a larger share of the profits generated by his product, without getting complete control of the rental of
the product. Society would get the benefits of diverse products
70. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d
483 (1950). See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 566 (1971) (reproduction of literary, artistic, or musical property as unfair competition).
71. See supra § II for a discussion of contributory infringement.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982).
73. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) ("because of the
federal patent laws a State may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for such copying." Id. at 232-33.).
74. 17 U.S.C. ch. 8 (1982).
75. S. 1758 amend. 1333, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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without compromising the right to privacy. Short-term rental which
induces piracy should be prohibited.
Congress should also clarify the extent to which home use is
protected by the doctrine of fair use. It is impossible to interpret
the copyright act consistently with the intentions of Congress when
those intentions have been perceived to be (1) a limited protection
for home recording of audio works that was removed by the passing
of the Copyright Act of 1976 or (2) a blanket protection for all recording done in the home, including the copying of television shows
and software. Congressional silence on this issue is a disservice to
the courts and the people.
If Congress does not act, the courts are not empowered to implement a system of royalties. The right of a lawful owner to rent
copies of the software is granted by section 109(a) of the Copyright
Act, and any royalty scheme imposed by the courts would violate
the statute. The courts should instead apply the doctrine of contributory infringement, and extend it to include those cases in which
the contribution to infringement is unfair, though the actual infringer is excused. The doctrine of fair use should allow software
rental only when the benefit of the noninfringing uses to which the
lessor's efforts contribute outweighs the harm caused by certain infringing lessees.
The goal of the copyright law is to promote the sciences and
useful arts. Software developers need economic incentive to create
products if they are to further that goal. They need adequate assurance that they will be the principal beneficiaries of the profits generated by their products. They must also be adequately compensated
for the rental of their packages, since rental encourages piracy.
Congress must limit or eliminate short term leasing to protect the
rights of the copyright holders. If Congress does not act, the courts
should apply the contributory infringement theory to curtail this
activity.
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